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XXII. PHILOSOPHICAL MEANING 
As we have seen, philosophy was one of the major contri­
butions of Greek Civilization. It was the Greeks who gave it 
its first major impetus as well as its name, "the love of learn 
ing." This very phrase embodies the most important aspects of 
their contribution to the West: the love of the best or most 
excellent; the search for something beyond a description of 
immediate experience; and the attempt to grasp, in some com­
prehensive fashion, both the actual and the ideal, both the 
given and the possible. In order to accomplish this task 
philosophy has, as we have seen, traditionally included the 
following major subdivisions: epistemology, the study of how 
we know; logic, the study of how we think; ethics, the study of 
how we act; aesthetics, the study of what we enjoy; and meta­
physics, the study of what is real. 
Philosophy can be, and often has been treated in isolation 
from the periods of history in which it is found. It can be 
studied as concerned solely with its own problems. Treated 
this way, its life can be read as a series of constructions, 
followed by criticisms of those constructions, which in turn 
yield still other constructions, in a somewhat dialectical 
fashion. In this manner it is possible to study Hegel's 
thought as both a criticism of Enlightenment epistemology and 
ethics, and a reconstruction on a new basis. 
It is, however, just as possible to treat philosophy as 
an integral part of the period of history in which it appears. 
It can be studied as concerned primarily with the problems of 
its time, as attempting to solve the practical problems with 
which its time is faced. Read this way, philosophy can be 
treated as a series of answers to the questions which civili­
zation asks of it. In this manner it is possible to study 
Hegel's philosophy as an attempt to answer the questions raised 
by the events of the French Revolution and the rise of Napoleon 
And each of these two interpretations would be as valid an 
approach to philosophy as the other, a fact which gives one a 
clue as to its very nature. 
The basis^for such a dual attitude can be seen from the 
side of philosophy as well as from the side of civilization. 
Because philosophy is an attempt to give a total world picture, 
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it cannot help but include within its range all of man's concerns: 
his economics as well as his aesthetics; his politics as well as 
his religion; and his technology as well as his ethics. Philo­
sophy brings to bear on all of man's interests both its critical 
and its constructive attitudes. Furthermore, and this is particu­
larly true in the West, where it has been interested in the actual 
as well as the ideal, it evidences that same dynamic restlessness 
which has been true of our civilization from its very beginning. 
It is therefore quite normal for Western philosophy to make common 
cause with civilization in the interests of progress, reform, and 
improvement. 
On the other hand, there have always been some Western philo­
sophers who have refused to accept the mantle of cultural counselor, 
or attendant in some intellectual service station. As soon as 
philosophy accepts such roles, they argue, it can at best produce 
nothing more than a few specifics for its society's ills. This 
interpretation of its role would, they insist, deny philosophy's 
high calling in a number of ways. First, it would be a rejection 
of philosophy's primary work, which is to understand, rather than, 
to try to change, things. Second, it would involve philosophy in 
a concern for partial and immediate problems, and could not but 
result in its never gaining any approximation of an interpretation 
of the whole range of human experience. Third, it would mean that 
anything which philosophy might offer in the way of a solution 
could, at very best, be nothing more than an ideological prescrip­
tion, rather than a metaphysical interpretation of what is basic 
and real. 
Because contemporary civilization's demand for meaning is, 
in so many ways, similar to philosophy's own demand for meaning, 
these two strands have tended to merge in the minds of a great 
many people. This situation helps to account for much of the 
present interest in philosophy. At the same time, seldom has the 
ambivalence between philosophy and civilization been more evident 
than it is today. Indeed, one of the more popular ways of divid­
ing philosophers is into those who see it as a means of solving our 
' contemporary problems, and those who see it as primarily concerned 
with solving its own problems, and only incidentally interested in 
those besetting civilization. It is this very tension within 
philosophical thought which helps to account for the tremendous 
productivity of philosophy today, both in terms of criticism and 
of construction. Such a situation can be made all the more clear 
if we approach contemporary philosophy historically, starting 
with its various reactions to the absolute idealism of Hegel. 
Most of the philosophy of the nineteenth century, as well as 
much of its religious thought, started with an attack on some aspect 
of the great Hegelian synthesis. This system, which claimed to 
harmonize science and ethics, which purported to synthesize the 
actual and the ideal by means of its dialectic, which offered its 
own version of "whatever is is right," which interpreted freedom 
as the appreciation of necessity, and which saw in the modern 
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national state the Absolute in action, was attacked from both 
theoretical and practical points of view. The earliest of the 
telling attacks came at the hands of three Continental rebels; 
Kierkegaard, Marx, and Nietzsche. Despite very great differences 
of approach, their attacks on Hegelian thought were alike in 
three important respects, and this is true without there having 
been any communication between the three men. They went beyond 
those who argued that Hegel's attempt to be objective had failed, 
to insist that any such attempt at synthesis was by its very 
nature impossible. Philosophy was, for them, merely the justifi­
cation or expression of some other aspect of human experience 
than the intellectual. An objective or rational philosophy like 
Hegel's was, in their minds, out of the question. They were also 
united in a metaphysical attack on Hegel's idealism. While 
Kierkegaard argued for a God who was transcendent, Marx for a 
materialistic metaphysics, and Nietzsche for the will to power 
as basic, they were at one in insisting that any idealistic meta­
physics was impossible. 
These two points led to a third area of agreement: for each 
of these three thinkers philosophy was primarily a means of chang­
ing the situation in which men found themselves. This we have 
already noted in Marx' statement that up to his time philosophy 
had tried to understand the world, but that the time had come to 
change it. While Marx' change was to be achieved by collective 
means, those of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche were individual, the 
former's by religious means, the latter's by aesthetic and ethical. 
It is from these three men, as well as from English liberalism, 
that we get the strand of contemporary thought which looks upon 
philosophy as primarily a means of change and reform. 
The twentieth century attacks on Hegel's thought, however, 
have been more theoretical than practical, and have focused 
largely on his epistemology. This has led to such a concentration 
on the problems of meaning and knowing that there is a strong 
tendency to say, not only that Hegel's metaphysics was wrong, as 
the nineteenth century did, but also to deny the very possibility 
of any valid metaphysics at all. It is just impossible, these 
contemporaries argue, for anyone to say what reality really or 
what it must be. This current attack is aimed at the metaphysics 
of Aristotle as well as of Hegel. 
Hegelian thought crossed the English Channel during the post-
Enlightenment at the same time that it was being attacked on the 
Continent, and bade fair to become the leading English philosophy 
from its new home in Oxford University. But the epistemological 
interests derived from the early British empiricists (Locke, 
Berkeley, and Hume), as well as the continuing emphasis on the 
free moral person, served to produce a reaction to such absolute 
idealism. About 1900 a counter attack was launched from Cambridge 
University, ^ere G. E. Moore (1873-1958) began the common-sense 
empirical attack on the rationalism of Hegelian epistemology. A 
person's ordinary experiences were sufficient, he argued, for him 
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to know that he had a pair of hands, and there was no need for 
him to go beyond such experiences into the realms of rational­
istic speculation to prove that fact. The same argument was 
applied to the independent existence of the whole realm of 
nature. This approach led Moore to study the language in which 
people's thoughts were expressed, in the interest of excising 
from it such unnecessary speculative abstractions as reality, 
being, idea, and other Hegelian categories. In the attempt to 
do this the question which he continually asked was: What do 
you mean? What does this statement mean? Answers to these 
questions led one back to ordinary experience, he argued, and 
not into the realms of abstract speculation. 
The work of Moore was of great importance for two reasons. 
Through his criticism a number of people were freed of their 
allegiance to Hegelian rationalism and absolutism. Further, his 
interest in language started a new approach to philosophy. While 
earlier thinkers, such as Hobbes and Bentham, had evidenced a 
real interest in language, it was Moore who saw philosophy's 
main task as the clarification of language. And it is out of 
this concern for language that one major aspect of contemporary 
British and American philosophy, the analytical, has appeared. 
Analytical philosophy has helped to produce w|iat we call seman-
tics, the practical study of the ways in which words are used, 
including the effects which certain words, such as democratic, 
communist, or politician, produce. While the study of semantics 
has been helpful in cfjtain social problems, as well as in advert­
ising, the analytical ichool of philosophy has very carefully 
avoided any suggestion that theirs is a technique for solving 
practical problems. 
While Moore and his followers continued their investigation 
of ordinary language, Bertrand Riissell (1872) turned the analytical 
method in another direction by applying it to different problems. 
He agreed with Moore tliat philosophy's work was primarily analytical, 
but wished to apply it'to the questions of logic and mathematics 
which had always interested him. One of his earliest questions 
was why certain matheihatical and geometrical statements (a straight 
line is the shortest distance between two points, for example) 
should be accepted. Philosophy, as he saw it, was primarily con­
cerned with propositlbfts, statements in logical form. But his 
study of the Aristotelian type of proposition convinced him that 
the older subject-predicate form of statement (A is the cause of 
B, for example) was llriadequate for contemporary needs, especially 
those of modern mathi^ftiatics and science. Aristotle had viewed the 
world as made up of substances with certain attributes, and relations 
as one form of attribute. According to him, the statement, "The 
boy runs," to be logical must be changed to read, "The boy is the 
one who is running," If such relations were to make a difference 
they had to be internal and, as an inescaipable result, each thing, 
person, or event became nothing mojre than the accumulation of its 
qualities and relations, thus losing its own individuality and 
integrity. v 
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In this work Russell was joined by his Cambridge mathe­
matics teacher, Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947), of whom 
more later. Together they wrote the Principia Mathematica 
(1910-1913), in three volumes, which marked a watershed in the 
history of mathematical and logical thought. They made a sus­
tained attempt to reduce numbers and their relations to logical 
ideas and propositions. The result was so successful that, while 
it has remained a stumbling-block for the uninitiated, the work 
stands as a major development in symbolic logic and a constant 
reference work for the philosophy of science. 
The linguistic analysis of Moore and the logical analysis 
of Russell were reenforced and given further impetus by the 
appearance of a group of thinkers centering at Vienna during and 
after World War I. Led by such men as Moritz Schlick (1882-1936) 
and Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951), they developed a school of 
thought which was first called logical positivism, and later 
logical empiricism. The names are significant because the first 
one helps connect their thought to Comte, a connection which they 
soon rejected, while the second one helps indicate their attempt 
to hold together both reason and experience, but in a radically 
different way. Most of the Vienna circle had originally been 
scientists, and they approached the problems of knowing from 
the point of view of their applicability to the new physical 
sciences. While there were differences of interest and emphasis, 
and the group disappeared as a school, there was fairly general 
agreement among them on a number of important points. 
The logical empiricists began their analysis by dividing 
the sentences which people utter into two kinds; the meaningful 
and the meaningless. A sentence is meaningful only if it expresses 
a meaningful statement, whereas a sentence is meaningless if no 
such statement is expressed. A meaningful statement is, for them, 
one of which the truth or falsity can be ascertained. There are 
only two types of such statements. The first includes those which 
are true or false because they contain intelligible definitions of 
the way in which words or symbols are to be used. Appealing to the 
work of Russell in mathematical logic, the logical empiricists can 
now show that all statements in arithmetic, including algebra, and 
logic are true by virtue of their definitions of the way in which 
words or symbols are to be used. For example, two plus two equals 
four is merely a definition of the way in which the symbols are 
to be used. These definitions are purely linguistic, and have no 
reference beyond the range of language at all. The second type of 
meaningful statements includes those which are true or false because 
they assert matters of fact whose truth is dependent on the possi­
bility of their being verified. The statement that it is raining 
today can be empirically verified. Such a distinction within mean­
ingful statements is closely analogous to the one Hiime made about 
the relations of ideas and matters of fact. 
The essential point with regard to statements which assert 
matters of fact is that they are either themselves directly veri­
fiable in sensible experience, or they imply statements which are 
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verifiable, A statement is regarded as verifiable when it is 
provable in principle, even though not in fact. Thus the geo­
graphical features of the side of the moon which is always facing 
away from the earth are legitimate objects of meaningful state­
ments. What is in fact now unverifiable is verifiable in principle 
since trips to the moon are quite conceivable» 
The statements most abhorred by the logical empiricists are 
those which are not, even in principle, verifiable in sensible 
experience, and which nevertheless claim to be more than defi­
nitions. Such meaningless statements include especially those of 
theology and metaphysics. Also, the statements which express 
value judgments, such as those of ethics and aesthetics, are 
usually classified as meaningless by the critical school. This 
somewhat startling fact results from the argument that value 
judgments are not verifiable. We ordinarily refuse to recognize 
that something is good or beautiful juist because someone else 
approves of it, but we are not able to offer any verifiable 
criteria for agreement on the matter. The truth or falsity of 
statements containing good or beautiful cannot therefore be 
verified. And, if unverifiable, the statements which contain 
such judgments are meaningless in the strict logical-empiricist 
sense of that word. They are described as emotive "expressions" 
of our likes and dislikes and, for this reason, the theory is 
often referred to as the "ouch" theory of ethics. It may be a 
fact that some people believe that genocide is wrong, but it is 
impossible to verify the statement that genocide is wrong. While 
the logical empiricist is more than willing to heTp us try to 
define what we mean by such terms as "wrong," he refuses to allow 
us to interpret statements containing these words as being veri­
fiable . 
